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Capital Cities, Conflict, and Misgovernance†
By Filipe R. Campante,  Quoc-Anh Do, and Bernardo Guimaraes*
We investigate the links between capital cities, conflict, and the qual-
ity of governance, starting from the assumption that incumbent elites 
are constrained by the threat of insurrection, and that the latter is 
rendered less effective by distance from the seat of political power. 
We show evidence that (i) conflict is more likely to emerge (and dis-
lodge incumbents) closer to the capital, and (ii) isolated capitals are 
associated with misgovernance. The results hold only for relatively 
 nondemocratic countries and for intrastate conflicts over govern-
ment (as opposed to territory)—exactly the cases where our central 
assumption should apply. (JEL D72, D74, O17, O18, R12)
According to the World Governance Indicators, Equatorial Guinea is a very poorly governed country: it scores below the tenth percentile across countries 
in all measures of quality of governance—with the exception of political stabil-
ity, where it was around the thirtieth percentile (as of 2014) and trending down-
ward. It is also the country with the largest proportion of its population living below 
the (national) poverty line (76.8 percent, in 2006, as per the World Bank). Yet 
its leader, President Teodoro Obiang, who has won recent elections with a share 
of votes exceeding 95 percent, is currently devoting a substantial amount of the 
country’s large oil revenues to building a new capital city, Oyala. As described by 
the BBC (2012), “Oyala will house the president, the government, and—according 
to the master plan—up to 200,000 people. Where the inhabitants will come from is 
VOL. 11 NO. 3 299CAMPANTE ET AL.: CAPITAL CITIES, CONFLICT, AND MISGOVERNANCE
anyone’s guess. The   population of the entire country ( just over 750,000) could fit 
into the city of Leeds (UK), and the vast majority live far away, close to the coast.”
Why have the capital at such a peculiar location? The Sackur (2012) notes that 
“it’s the remoteness of Oyala that makes it so appealing to President Obiang. In a 
rare interview he described how rebels had recently plotted a seaborne assault on his 
palace in the current capital, Malabo. ‘We need a secure place for my government 
and for future governments. That’s why we have created Oyala, to guarantee the 
government of Equatorial Guinea.’ ”
This paper shows that this example illustrates a broader, systematic pattern link-
ing quality of governance, the threat of conflict, and the spatial distribution of a 
country’s population relative to the seat of political power. Many have noted that the 
threat of insurrection and conflict can play a crucial role in the emergence of good 
governance, as it limits the ability of rulers and elites to appropriate the apparatus of 
government to their own benefit.1 It looms especially large when there are relatively 
few explicit, formally established checks and balances, such as those imposed by 
a  well-functioning democratic process through which incumbents might be held 
accountable.
We start off with the recognition, motivated by the historical evidence, that capi-
tal cities have often played a pivotal role in determining the outcome of insurgencies 
and revolutionary standoffs—and that incumbents react to the incentives posed by 
this role. While few are as frank about their motives as the Equatoguinean leader, 
similar examples of planned and executed capital city relocations abound. Most 
important, many other, perhaps less extreme policies can also affect the distribution 
of population relative to the capital—say, spatially targeted economic incentives 
and subsidies, or restrictions to internal migration—and be used to respond to these 
incentives.
We study the implications of this recognition for the quality of governance and 
for the spatial distribution of conflict. We first present a model to guide our inter-
pretation of the empirical results. The model considers an incumbent elite that can 
extract rents but is subject to the threat of rebellions from dissatisfied citizens. Our 
key assumption is that rebellions that take place closer to the capital city are more 
effective. This embodies the principle that “spatial proximity to power increases 
political influence” (Ades and Glaeser 1995, 198), and especially so when that influ-
ence is mediated by the threat of violence.
This assumption has implications for the spatial distribution of conflict: conflict 
is more likely to emerge closer to the capital city, and more likely to dislodge the 
incumbent regime when it happens close to the capital. Intuitively, it is cheaper 
for incumbents to obtain a given amount of stability by buying off those who live 
far away: they can be placated with less because they represent a lesser threat. 
Incumbents are thus willing to live with a greater probability of conflict nearby, in 
spite of the greater danger it entails.
1 On the emergence of institutions as a result of latent social conflict and (the threat of) violence, see Acemoglu 
and Robinson (2006), Besley and Persson (2009), Bueno de Mesquita and Smith (2008), or Guimaraes and Sheedy 
(2017). 
300 AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL: APPLIED ECONOMICS JULY 2019
Allowing the incumbent elite to choose the degree of isolation of the capital city 
and the quality of governance yields an association between isolated capitals and 
misgovernance.2 This reflects causality going in both directions. On the one hand, 
a more isolated capital induces worse governance: when incumbent elites are more 
protected against the threat of rebellion, they can extract rents more easily and have 
less incentive to share power and rents. On the other hand, bad governance increases 
the incentive to isolate the capital because incumbents in a less productive economy 
will worry less about the losses induced by that additional isolation.
The empirical evidence corroborates these results. We first look at worldwide 
geo-located data on the onset and prevalence of conflict. We show that intrastate 
conflict is more likely to start and to occur in places that are closer to the capital 
city, controlling for income, population, and a number of geographical variables 
(including broad measures of isolation unrelated to the capital city). Using the panel 
variation and changes in country borders and capital city moves—arguably exoge-
nous with respect to local characteristics—as the source of identification, we also 
find that, for a given place, conflict becomes more likely when the capital is moved 
closer to that place. Finally, we show that moving the capital closer to a given place 
increases the likelihood that the onset of conflict in that location will be associated 
with regime change.
Reassuringly, these empirical patterns hold only in contexts where we would 
expect the forces we focus on to be most important. First, they are present only 
in relatively  nondemocratic countries, where the threat of conflict should be more 
salient as a constraint on rulers. Second, we find no link between distance to the cap-
ital and the types of conflict to which our logic should not apply. In particular, that 
is the case for interstate conflicts and for “territorial” intrastate conflicts—namely, 
those where the main claimed incompatibility regards territory (e.g., separatist 
insurgencies), as opposed to who gets to control the government. Third, we find 
no results when using distance to the largest ( noncapital) city, suggesting that our 
findings are not spuriously driven by general isolation unrelated to the capital. Last 
but not least, our findings are also pointedly inconsistent with what one might have 
expected from alternative explanations: for instance, if the link were driven purely 
by weak state capacity, it would stand to reason that conflict would be more likely 
farther from the capital, as the reach of the state grows feebler. Similarly, we would 
expect no difference with respect to territorial conflict.
We then look at the link between capital cities and governance. We find robust 
evidence that isolated capitals are indeed associated with misgovernance, con-
trolling for a number of standard correlates of quality of governance and isolation of 
the capital, and using different ways of measuring these concepts.
Other pieces of evidence reinforce our confidence that this correlation indeed 
captures the operation of the forces we highlight. First, the correlation is again 
present only for relatively  nondemocratic countries. Second, when we unpack the 
 definition of governance, we see that in fact the autocracies with isolated capitals 
2 We take the choice of location of the capital city as a  shorthand description for all the policy levers that affect 
the spatial distribution of individuals relative to the capital city, of which actually relocating the capital is just a 
relatively extreme example—though, as we will see, not that infrequently used or contemplated. 
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have governments that are less effective, less accountable, more corrupt, and less 
able or willing to sustain the rule of law; however, they are not more unstable. This 
is consistent with the idea that isolation is a way of protecting against the threat of 
removal. Neither is there any correlation between isolated capitals and measures of 
government performance that are unrelated to the kind of institutional incentives our 
framework highlights, again suggesting that our empirical findings are unlikely to 
be driven by some unrelated link between isolated capitals and lack of state capacity.
Similarly, we find evidence that the correlation is indeed about the role of the 
 capital city: controlling for the isolation of the country’s largest city other than the 
capital leaves results unaffected. Along with the evidence on conflict, this is reas-
suring against the possibility that isolation from the capital might have been proxy-
ing for factors related to the state’s ability to supply a  high-quality institutional 
infrastructure to relatively isolated places. We also find direct evidence that isolated 
capital cities are associated with less power sharing, as captured by constraints on 
executive power and by the extent of political competition. Finally, we find evi-
dence—again, only for the sample of relatively  nondemocratic countries—for the 
model’s ancillary results: the isolation of the capital city is positively correlated with 
the income per capita in the capital (relative to the country as a whole), and nega-
tively related with military spending (which could be used as an alternative source 
of protection).
This paper relates to a range of different strands of literature. It fits directly into 
the one that stresses the political implications of spatial distributions, both in eco-
nomics (e.g., Ades and Glaeser 1995, Davis and Henderson 2003) and in political 
science (e.g., Rodden 2010). In fact, the importance of the spatial distribution of 
population and its connection with the threat of rebellion facing rulers has long been 
recognized by an important group: rulers themselves. As we discuss in detail later, 
the history of decisions on where to locate capital cities suggests that protection 
against perceived instability threat is a pervasive concern behind capital relocations, 
either planned or actually implemented.
We emphasize the special role of the capital city, and in that we are closely related 
to Campante and Do (2014). That paper looks at how the spatial distribution of 
population and the isolation of capital cities affect government performance across 
US states by conditioning the degree of accountability provided by the news media 
and the electoral process. We look here at a very different mechanism, related to the 
threat of conflict, which we show to be in force in a very different,  nondemocratic 
context.3 Another crucial distinction is that, while that paper points at a direction 
of causality running from the isolation of the capital to governance, we argue here 
that the reverse direction is just as important in the case of weakly institutionalized 
polities, as incumbents have considerably more influence in affecting the spatial 
distribution of population relative to the capital.
3 While that paper’s results seem in tension with our finding of an absence of a link between the degree of 
isolation and governance in established democracies, they can be reconciled quite naturally: as much as there is 
a real difference between the extent of corruption in, say, Minnesota and Louisiana, this is evidently swamped by 
the variation across countries. It is not surprising that the  cross-country evidence is painted with strokes that are 
too broad to detect the effect of the subtler mechanisms that are in play in established democracies, and which we 
leave aside here. 
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We contribute to the voluminous literature on intrastate conflict and civil wars 
(see Blattman and Miguel 2010 for a survey). Our focus is on one of the possi-
ble motivations for conflict, namely attempts to bring down an incumbent regime, 
and even more narrowly, on its spatial dimensions. Still, we relate directly to the 
strand within that literature that considers the role of geographic and demographic 
factors (e.g., Fearon and Laitin 2003), and in doing so, we address several of the 
aspects highlighted by Sambanis (2005) as in need of empirical exploration: distinc-
tions between established democracies and more fragile environments, geographic 
concentration of power, or the degree of state control over a country’s geographic 
periphery. As we have argued, our results go against the more standard presumption 
that isolated areas are more prone to conflict, further illustrating the value of consid-
ering the special role of capital cities, and of differentiating between different types 
of conflict.4
We also build on the literature on the endogenous emergence of institutions and 
their implications for development. In particular, we address the broad question 
of the persistence of inefficient institutions (e.g., Acemoglu 2006, Guimaraes and 
Sheedy 2017). We identify the spatial distribution of individuals as a novel source 
of variation in the constraints that underpin institutional choices, which may leave 
agents who stand to benefit from those inefficient institutions better able to get away 
with their preferences. We are also close to the recent strand of that literature that 
has tried to unpack the evolution of political institutions along different dimensions, 
such as checks and balances, power sharing, and political stability (e.g., Besley, 
Persson, and  Reynal-Querol 2016). We provide further support for the view that 
these can interact in subtle ways and move in separate directions as a result.
Finally, we relate to a literature on how the isolation of countries or their geo-
graphical size affects institutions and development—such as Nunn and Puga (2012) 
and Ashraf, Özak, and Galor (2010). They do not deal with the specific institu-
tional role of the capital city and its isolation. On a different vein, Stasavage (2010) 
emphasizes how geographical distances from European capital cities might have 
hindered the historical development of representative institutions through reduced 
accountability, though his historical data do not allow for consideration of the spa-
tial distribution of population.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II discusses some motivating histor-
ical evidence, Section III presents the model, Section IV discusses the empirical 
evidence, and Section V concludes.
I. Revolutions and Capital Cities
Physical proximity to the stronghold of government matters critically when it 
comes to removing it by force: a relatively small mob in the capital city poses as 
much of a threat as a much larger group of rebels elsewhere. It follows that the 
4 For instance, Buhaug and Rød (2006) finds evidence, using African data, that separatist conflict is more likely 
in isolated areas near national borders and farther from the capital, where control by the central government is 
weaker. In contrast, Besley and  Reynal-Querol (2014) finds that conflict in Africa is more likely closer to the capital 
city, in line with our results. 
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population in and around the capital is especially important in these contexts, as 
can be illustrated by a brief look at a few revolutionary episodes over the past three 
centuries.
A classic example is the transition century from the ancien régime to the Third 
Republic in France. Around the time of the French Revolution, the 550,000 people 
living in Paris certainly did not represent the average or median opinion of some 29 
million Frenchmen, among which were many royalists willing to defend the monar-
chy.5 While turmoil in the countryside was certainly important leading up and in the 
aftermath of the Revolution (Markoff 1996), the Parisian crowd packed a far heavier 
revolutionary punch, as described by Tilly (2003, 162–167), than those anywhere 
else. As put by Traugott (1995, 148) in his analysis of French insurrections during 
the following century: “as Paris goes, so goes the nation.”
In fact, the Parisian streets witnessed considerably more intense and consequen-
tial revolutionary action than other places, as can be seen from the historical evi-
dence on barricade episodes in  nineteenth-century France. Table 1, compiled from 
Traugott (2010), shows that Paris had more episodes, which tended to last longer 
and be of greater magnitude than elsewhere.
The logic linking revolutions and capital cities is by no means limited to eigh-
teenth and  nineteenth-century France, of course. As put by The Economist, in the 
context of the 2006 “Orange Revolution” in the Ukraine—and as was repeated in 
the same country in 2014—“during a [revolutionary]  stand-off, the capital city is 
crucial” (March 18, 2006, 28). The lingering political turmoil in Thailand, in recent 
years, is another example of how hard it is for a government to stay in power if it 
lacks support from the population of the capital city, even when such government 
was largely popular elsewhere in the country (The Economist, September 22, 2006). 
By the same token, incumbent regimes are obviously especially concerned with 
securing the capital city when the threat of rebellion becomes acute (e.g., Arriola 
2013 on the case of Ethiopia).
The importance of the capital is underscored by the many incumbent rulers who 
have tried to manipulate the concentration of population around the capital by mov-
ing the latter. More often than not, alleviating revolutionary pressure was one of the 
explicit or barely concealed goals behind those moves, as so vividly illustrated by 
the aforementioned case of Equatorial Guinea.
In fact, examples from history abound. In the seventeenth century, Louis XIV 
moved away from the masses into the tranquility of Versailles, a move motivated 
by his dislike of Paris, stemming from the rebellions against the Crown he suffered 
during his youth, and by his desire to “not again allow the Paris populace […] to 
threaten the French monarchy.” (Kirkland 2013, 4) Modern examples are also easy 
to come by, and many other countries have fiddled with the idea, even if falling short 
of carrying it through. In just about every case, a chief concern was to have the new 
5 National and city population figures come from estimates of McEvedy and Jones (1978) and from Braudel 
(1986), who observed that France at the end of the ancien régime was still very much a rural country. Later on, 
royalist  counterrevolutionaries rioted in Brittany, La Vandée, and Dauphiné, regions too far from Paris to make any 
difference. 
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capitals to be “quiet, orderly places where civil servants could get on with their jobs 
without distraction” (The Economist, December 18, 1997).
Looking closely at a couple of these modern examples helps illuminate that logic. 
Brazil moved the capital in 1960 from Rio de Janeiro to Brasília—many hundreds of 
kilometers away from the main population centers of Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo 
and far from the coast, where most of the country’s population was and still is. As 
Couto (2001) remarks, one of the factors motivating the president who decided to 
build the new capital from scratch, Juscelino Kubitschek, was a desire to escape 
from the atmosphere of political agitation in Rio, where the president was more 
exposed to political crises and student demonstrations. As he himself put it, rather 
colorfully: “A tramway strike in Rio de Janeiro may bring down the President of the 
Republic” (Couto 2001, 199, our translation).
The recent move in Myanmar (Burma) in 2005 from the major population center 
of Yangon (Rangoon) to the fortified “secret mountain compound” of Naypyidaw 
is another illuminating, if somewhat extreme example (Mydans 2005). It has been 
noted that the new capital seems to have been designed to further isolation and 
minimize the possibilities of urban upheaval (Varadarajan 2007). As if to emphasize 
this design, the city was deliberately planned without mobile phone coverage, and 
civil servants were not allowed to take their spouses or children along when they 
originally moved (Htay 2007). These are measures that are hard to justify under 
the  oft-mentioned rationales of developing an underpopulated part of the country or 
protecting against foreign invasion.
This pattern can be seen more systematically with the help of Table 2. This table 
lists all instances in which capital cities were moved, on a permanent basis, by for-
mally independent countries since World War I, with the corresponding distances 
and population numbers.6 These are not rare episodes: on average, capital moves 
happen once every six years, and there are examples from every continent. Most 
6 Sources are listed in the online Data Appendix. Population numbers are for as close to the event as could be 
found. Exceptions involving temporary moves or moves within a 10 km radius are listed in the notes below the 
table. 
Table 1—Independent Barricade Episodes in France, 1789–1900
Observations Mean SD Min Max
Paris
Magnitude 19 9.5 6 4 24
Duration 18 2.8 2.8 1 13
Rest of France
Magnitude 9 6.8 4.2 3 15
Duration 8 1.6 0.5 1 2
Notes: The table considers all “independent” events (namely, those not triggered by episodes 
occurring elsewhere) between 1789 (excluded) and 1900. “Magnitude” is the sum of the codes 
for “Number of Insurgents” (1 = 1 to 99; 2 = 100 to 999; 3 = 1,000 to 9,999; 4 = 10,000 and 
up), “Number of Insurgent Deaths” (0 = none; 1 = 1 to 9; 2 = 10 to 99; 3 = 100 to 999; 4 = 
1,000 and up), and “Number of Barricades” (2 = 1 to 9; 4 = 10 to 99; 8 = 100 to 999; 16 = 
1,000 and up). Duration is measured in days.
Source: Traugott (2010)
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important from our standpoint, the moves are overwhelmingly in the direction of 
greater isolation, at least under the rough measure of capital primacy (share of pop-
ulation in the capital city). This pattern might have been expected since the capital is 
typically the largest city in the country, but it is striking that the typical new capital 
is a lot smaller than the old one—often built from scratch.
The relatively extreme policy lever of picking or influencing the location of the 
capital city is useful to illustrate the point, but we should stress that many other 
levers are available. For instance, incumbents can try to placate discontent aris-
ing in the capital, or otherwise influence the distribution of population around the 
 capital—say, with special incentives or coercion toward populating certain areas of 
the country or with restrictions on domestic migration.7
To be sure, the power of the capital is not absolute, and there are other forces 
that could push in the opposite direction. For instance, many have emphasized that 
7 Stark examples of such policies are not hard to come by either: from relatively benign registration systems that 
restrict internal migration—such as the Chinese hukou or the Vietnamese hô khâu—to more extreme cases, such as 
the mass deportation of ethnic groups and the confinement of dissidents to remote areas in the Soviet Union, or the 
forced depopulation of cities during the reign of the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia. As with capital city moves, these 
are all policies that are not motivated solely by a desire to isolate the capital, but it is telling that one can hardly 
find examples of such regimes encouraging their populations to move closer. It is just as telling that they often 
specifically target groups considered particularly dangerous in terms of kindling insurgencies, such as disgruntled 
minorities or students. On the latter group, there have been many examples of universities being relocated away 
from the center of a capital city after episodes of student unrest, as illustrated by the relocation of the main campus 
of Seoul National University in South Korea in 1975 or those of Parisian universities in the aftermath of the events 
of May 1968. 
Table 2—Change in Capital Cities since World War I
Country From To Year Distance (km) Population (from) Population (to)
Russia St. Petersburg Moscow 1918 633 2.3 million (1917) 1.8 million (1915)
Turkey Istanbul Ankara 1923 351 680,000 (1927) 75,000 (1927)
Australia Melbourne Canberra 1927 472 670,000 (1914) –
China Nanjing Beijing 1949 1,219 2.8 million (1955) 2.8 million (1953)
Mauritania – Nouakchott 1957 – – 200 (1957)
Brazil Rio de Janeiro Brasilia 1960 754 3.1 million (1960) –
Rwanda Butare Kigali 1962 80 NA 6,000 (1962)
North Yemen Ta’izz Sana’a 1962 198 87,000 (1975) 135,000 (1975)
Pakistan Karachi Islamabad 1966 1,144 1.9 million (1961) –
Malawi Zomba Lilongwe 1974 227 24,000 (1977) 99,000 (1977)
Côte d’Ivoire Abidjan Yamoussoukro 1983 228 1.2 million (1978) 200,000 (2005)
Chilea Santiago Valparaiso 1990 98 4.6 million (1990) 800,000 (2002)
Nigeria Lagos Abuja 1991 541 5.7 million (1991) –
Tanzaniaa Dar-es-Salaam Dodoma 1996 571 2.3 million (2002) 213,000 (2002)
Kazakhstan Almaty Astana 1997 974 1.1 million (1999) 281,000 (1999)
Malaysiab Kuala Lumpur Putrajaya 1999 47 1.7 million (2000) 70,000 (2000)
Myanmar (Burma) Yangon Naypyidaw 2005 330 4.1 million (2007) –
Notes: We include the designation of capital cities by independent countries; any designation at the time of indepen-
dence is included only if the chosen capital is different from the colonial capital. (Mauritania had no colonial capi-
tal.) Instances where capital cities were moved within the same metopolitan area (<10 km), namely the Philippines 
(1975) and Sri Lanka (1982), are not included. (West) Germany (1990) and Albania (1920) are not included, since 
in these cases, the existing regimes had maintained temporary capitals pending reunification and completion of the 
independence process, respectively. “NA” stands for “not available.” Distance is measured “as the crow flies.” All 
cities are referred to by their current English designations.
a Legislative only
b Executive only
Source: Multiple sources (see online Appendix)
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 isolation may help insurgencies by making repression more difficult as in Mao 
Zedong’s  well-known account of guerrilla warfare (Mao 1961), or more broadly, 
that concentration facilitates an incumbent autocrat’s monitoring and suppression of 
opponents (Anthony and Crenshaw 2014). Similarly, while we argue that proximity 
to the capital may be important when it comes to insurgencies that aim at overthrow-
ing an incumbent government, it could well be the case that distance favors those 
that are trying to break away from the country instead. In any case, the relationship 
between distance to the capital and the threat of insurgencies, as well as the impli-
cations of this relationship, ultimately constitute open questions to be explored both 
conceptually and empirically.
II. A Simple Model
Against this background, we now propose a simple model of the joint determi-
nation of the quality of institutions and the degree of isolation of the capital city, 
mediated by the threat of conflict. Groups of individuals who are dissatisfied with 
existing institutions, under which an incumbent elite can extract rents from its cit-
izens, can challenge them by rebelling. Our key assumption is that those who are 
closer to the capital city—the seat of political power—will (ceteris paribus) have an 
advantage in that regard.
A. Basic Setup
Consider an economy populated by a continuum of individuals of measure one. A 
measure  p of individuals is in power (the “incumbent elite” or “incumbents”), and 
the remaining individuals are “citizens.” In order to capture the special role of the 
capital city in as simple a fashion as possible, we posit that there are different groups 
of citizens and two places where they can locate: the capital, denoted by 𝒞 , and else-
where, which we denote by ℱ (for “faraway”). We denote the fraction of citizens 
living in ℱ by  ℓ , which thus captures the degree of isolation of the capital city.
Conflict.—There are  n groups of citizens, which for simplicity we assume to be 
all of the same size. Group membership does not cut across different locations: 
either all individuals in group  ı are in ℱ ( ı = 1 ), or they are all in 𝒞 ( ı = 0 ).8 We 
define the net potential gain from conflict for group  ı as
(1)  γ ı ≡   y 
∗ 
 _ w ı − T  ℓ ı −  χ ı , 
where  y ∗ is a constant,  w ı is the available income for group  ı , chosen by the incum-
bents, and  χ is a parameter representing the cost of engaging in conflict.9 In online 
Appendix A, we show a model of conflict that yields this  reduced-form formulation.
8 We take groups as given, for simplicity, but in Campante, Do, and Guimaraes (2013), we show a model where 
group formation is endogenous. 
9 One possible interpretation for  y ∗ is that, as in Acemoglu and Robinson (2006), a successful rebellion leads 
to a democracy in which resources are equally divided among all groups, so that  y ∗ =  Y ∗ / n (possibly up to a 
constant). 
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The positive constant  T embodies our key assumption: those who are far from 
the capital ( ℓ ı = 1 ) obtain a lower net potential gain from launching a rebellion. 
This provides us with a simple shortcut for capturing the special role played by the 
capital city in insurrections. A conflict involving group  ı arises if it pays off for that 
group ( γ ı ≥ 0 ). If that happens, incumbents are dislodged from power. Since there 
is no uncertainty in the conflict technology, no conflict arises in equilibrium: the 
condition in (1) effectively yields the income incumbents must leave with citizens in 
order to avoid it. In online Appendix B.B2, we extend the model to allow for conflict 
in equilibrium by considering  χ ı to be a random variable and also for a probabilistic 
chance of success depending on effort.
Still, the threat of conflict lies at the very heart of the mechanism we study, and 
our key assumption has important implications for the spatial distribution of con-
flict, as we show formally in online Appendix B.B2. In particular, conflict is more 
dangerous for the incumbent elite when it occurs close to the capital city, since 
groups located in 𝒞 pose a greater threat. In spite of that, conflict is more likely 
to occur close to the capital city: it is more costly for incumbents to buy an extra 
amount of stability from those groups, precisely because they pose a greater threat. 
As a result, those in the capital city also obtain more rents in equilibrium, a premium 
that is increasing in their relative technological advantage in conflict,  T .
Quality of Governance.—We consider a production function that depends on the 
spatial distribution of population (relative to the capital) and the quality of gover-
nance. Specifically, let  ℓ ∗ be the  output-maximizing degree of isolation of the capital 
city, which we take to be a primitive indicating the efficient spatial distribution of 
population relative to the capital.10 We can take this to capture a balance between 
congestion costs and economies of scale, but the specifics are immaterial: the crucial 
point is that there is a cost to completely isolating the capital. In the absence of such 
a cost, the elite’s problem would be trivially solved by totally isolating the capital, 
which would be both uninteresting and unrealistic.
We can then write
  Y = A( p) ( Y ∗ − ϕ(Δℓ)) , 
where  Y is the level of output,  Y ∗ corresponds to output when  ℓ =  ℓ ∗ ,  Δℓ ≡ ℓ −  ℓ ∗ 
and  ϕ(Δℓ) is the output loss owing to a choice of  ℓ different from  ℓ ∗ . We assume 
that ϕ is a convex function with  ϕ(0) = 0 ,  ϕ′(0) = 0 (optimality condition) and 
ϕ″ > 0 . As for power sharing  p and productivity  A , we assume that  A′ > 0 and 
A″ < 0 .
10 To fix ideas, we can think of a country where resources are spread over the country’s territory (say, the United 
States) as one where the optimal arrangement from a production standpoint involves a high degree of isolation 
 ℓ ∗ . In contrast, a country where resources are geographically concentrated (say, Egypt) would exemplify a low  ℓ ∗ . 
The Egyptian case is instructive, especially as the government has recently announced plans to build a new capital 
(Schiavenza 2015). While we would think it is hardly coincidental that relocation plans have been revived soon after 
the revolutionary episodes of the Arab Spring, the fact that the planned seat of government would be located in the 
outskirts of Cairo indicates that it might be quite costly to move the capital too far away. 
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The assumption on the productivity shifter  A is the other key ingredient: pro-
ductivity is enhanced by increasing the measure of individuals in power,  p . This 
captures the idea that sharing power entails good governance: for instance, the pro-
vision of public goods, such as protection of property rights and enforcement of 
contracts, requires checks and balances that have to be provided by a set of civil 
authorities. We interpret an increase in  p as the addition of such a set to the core 
of the incumbent elite, and their presence enables individuals to access better tech-
nologies that rely on those public goods. Under this assumption, we will refer to  p 
interchangeably as a measure of power sharing or of quality of governance.
The downside of good governance, from the incumbents’ standpoint, is that shar-
ing power requires sharing rents: all individuals in power must receive the same 
payoff.11 The choice of governance thus embeds a crucial  trade-off between having 
a larger pie and taking a larger slice of a smaller one.
B. Equilibrium
The incumbents’ problem can be seen as a choice of the isolation of the capital, 
ℓ , and the degree of power sharing,  p , subject to the constraint imposed by (1). After 
substituting the constraint and manipulating, we get that an incumbent’s income is 
equal to
(2)   =  1 _p[A( p)( Y ∗ − ϕ(Δℓ)) −  (1 − p)  y 
∗ 
 _χ ( χ + T(1 − ℓ)  ___________χ + T ) ] .
In words, the term in square brackets is the amount of output net of what needs to 
be given as income to citizens in order to avoid a rebellion. That is divided among a 
measure  p of incumbents.
The  first-order conditions help to explain the  trade-offs facing incumbents in this 
setting. Differentiating  with respect to  ℓ and manipulating yields
(3)  ϕ′(Δℓ) =  (1 − p)  y ∗ T  ___________  
A( p) χ(χ + T ).
In words, the marginal efficiency costs from isolating the capital  ϕ′(Δℓ) equal to 
the marginal benefit of the extra protection bought by that isolation: a more isolated 
capital makes it cheaper to stave off rebellion, as citizens who are farther away 
represent a lesser threat and can thus receive a lower level of consumption. Taking 
 first-order condition with respect to  p and manipulating yields
(4)  A( p) − pA′( p) =   y ∗  _______________ χ ( Y ∗ − ϕ(ℓ −  ℓ ∗ )) ( 
χ + T(1 − ℓ)
  ___________χ + T ) .
11 This  trade-off reflects the need to provide incentives for individuals in power to defend (and not rebel against) 
the current set of institutions. For a model, see Guimaraes and Sheedy (2017). 
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Adding an extra individual into the incumbent group raises output, but also implies 
that rents have to be shared more broadly. At the margin, these two effects must 
offset each other.
The expression for  Δℓ in (3) shows that isolation of the capital responds pos-
itively to  T (the impact of distance on the cost of rebellion). Intuitively, a higher 
T increases the effectiveness of isolating the capital city as a protection device. 
Naturally, an increase in  ℓ ∗ (the optimal degree of isolation) also leads to a larger 
ℓ . Last,  Δℓ also responds negatively to  p , implying that bad governance increases 
the incentives for isolating the capital city. Intuitively, incumbents in this case are 
less worried about the costs of that isolation in terms of output losses, as these are 
smaller in a less productive economy.
The expression in (4) shows that  p responds negatively to  ℓ ,  ℓ ∗ , and  T . Intuitively, 
when the capital city is more isolated or when the cost of conflict for those in far-
away places is larger, the average citizen poses a smaller threat to the incumbent 
regime. Hence, the latter can grab a larger amount of output and is thus less willing 
to share rents in exchange for an increase in productivity.
These two effects combined yield a key result, summarized in Proposition 1: 
isolated capital cities tend to be associated with worse quality of governance. 
The above reasoning highlights that this result reflects causality going in both 
directions.
PROPOSITION 1: Changes in  T and  ℓ ∗ induce a negative correlation between the 
quality of governance (  p ) and the degree of isolation of the capital city ( ℓ ).
PROOF: 
See online Appendix C.C1. ∎
We have assumed that the only way in which incumbents can deal with the threat 
of conflict is by changing the distribution of rents, sharing power, or increasing 
isolation. We can extend the model to also allow for the possibility of repression: 
incumbents can spend resources to increase their military power in order to make 
rebellions more costly. In online Appendix B.B1, we show that in this case a more 
isolated capital will be associated with less military spending: repression and iso-
lated capitals are substitutes in protecting incumbents. 
C. Discussion
Our framework, relying on the connection between the spatial distribution of 
population and the threat of rebellion, has a number of results linking capital cities, 
conflict, and quality of governance. First, the assumption that individuals located 
close to the capital possess an advantage in terms of the rebellion threat that they 
pose to incumbents implies that:
REMARK 1: Conflict is more likely to emerge closer to the capital city.
REMARK 2: Conflict that emerges close to the capital is more dangerous to 
incumbents.
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This stands in contrast with alternative theories of conflict. For instance, to the 
extent that conflict is associated with low state repressive capacity (e.g., Fearon and 
Laitin 2003), and that the reach of weak states gets even weaker as one moves away 
from the capital city (Michalopoulos and Papaioannou 2014), one would have pre-
dicted that the onset of conflict would be more likely farther from the capital.
In addition, Proposition 1 implies the following:
REMARK 3: Isolated capital cities are associated with misgovernance.
Isolation increases the incentives for misgovernance because it allows incumbents 
to grab a bigger slice of the pie, thus reducing the willingness to share power and the 
associated rents. By the same token, misgovernance makes isolation more appeal-
ing because in a less productive economy the costs of excessive isolation are less 
important.
Since the model relies on insurrection threats as checks on the behavior of incum-
bent elites, we would expect the forces it identifies to be weaker when that check 
is relatively less important. In particular, this should be the case for established 
democracies: rebellion threats are unlikely to be a particularly meaningful constraint 
impinging on incumbents in the United States or Western Europe.
Similarly, our framework models conflicts as insurrections that aim at overthrow-
ing an established government. As such, we should not expect the logic to hold in 
the case of conflicts driven by other objectives—say, where the incompatibility is 
around territory (e.g., separatist insurgencies) or in the typical interstate conflict. 
Hence, both democracies and conflicts that are not aimed at replacing an incumbent 
constitute “placebo” cases where we should not expect links between conflict, gov-
ernance, and capital cities.12
The model also yields a negative association between the isolation of the capital 
city and direct defensive measures that incumbents may resort to. We interpret this 
as a negative correlation with military spending, insofar as the latter is often driven, 
to a substantial extent, by a concern with domestic rebellions.13 Finally, the model 
also predicts that individuals living in the capital city will be relatively better off 
because of the greater political threat that they represent, and that this premium will 
be positively correlated with the isolation of the capital.
III. Capital Cities, Conflict, and Misgovernance: Empirical Evidence
We now turn our attention to the empirical evidence. We will start by assessing 
the link between capital cities and conflict, which is at the heart of the logic of our 
model, and then move on to the implications linking capital cities and the quality of 
governance.
12 It is less clear that these other types of conflict constitute placebos for Remark 2 because interstate conflict or 
conflict in a democracy could also be more destabilizing if they happened close to the capital. 
13 This result stands in contrast with alternative stories where the isolation of the capital is just an indication that 
the country is divided into different (and possibly antagonistic) regions, since in this case, one would expect more 
investment in protection. 
VOL. 11 NO. 3 311CAMPANTE ET AL.: CAPITAL CITIES, CONFLICT, AND MISGOVERNANCE
A. Capital Cities and Conflict
Data.—We start by describing more extensively the main variables needed to 
assess the relation between conflict and capital cities. (All other variables will be 
introduced as they are used and described in the online Data Appendix, which also 
contains descriptive statistics for all variables.)
Assessing how the likelihood and consequences of conflict relate to the distance 
to the capital city requires geo-located information on the incidence of conflict. 
For that, we use the  PRIO-GRID dataset (Tollefsen, Strand, and Buhaug 2012) 
(Advanced Conflict Data Catalogue [ACDC] project). This dataset makes available 
a number of different variables measured at the level of 0.5 × 0.5 decimal degree 
cells covering all terrestrial areas of the world. Each cell is, on any given year, 
attributed to one single (independent) country—for cells that straddle country bor-
ders, the attribution is to whichever independent country happens to contain the 
largest share of the cell’s territory.
The dataset contains a measure of distance (in kilometers) from the cell cen-
troid to the country’s capital, but the designation of capital cities did not generally 
track the instances of capital city moves—we added those manually (as described 
in Table 2). However, the dataset does cover changes in capital cities due to the 
breakup and emergence of new countries. We will use those sources of variation as 
an integral part of our identification strategy, as we discuss below.14
The dataset also records geo-located information on conflict. We use as our first 
main variable of interest the dummy  CivConf , coded for the years between 1989 and 
2008 (Hallberg 2012), which indicates whether a cell lies within an area afflicted 
by intrastate conflict in a particular year.15 Specifically, the data classifies conflict 
types into: conflicts between a state and a  non-state group outside its own territory 
(“colonial wars,” coded as “1”), between two or more states (interstate conflicts, 
“2”), conflicts between a state and one or more  non-state actors inside its own terri-
tory (intrastate conflicts, “3”), and intrastate conflicts with intervention from other 
states (internationalized intrastate conflicts, “4”). Our variable captures conflicts 
classified as “3” or “4,” since intrastate conflict is the kind of event our framework 
is concerned with.
We also want to exploit distinctions between different types of conflicts, in order to 
build placebo specifications, as argued in the previous section, and shed further light 
14 We were careful not to include, as changes in capital cities, the instances in which a given cell is reassigned 
to a different country simply as a result of the latter becoming independent with no actual breakup or annexation 
involved. For instance, suppose a cell happens to be on the border between Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire with 40 percent 
of its territory on the former and 60 percent on the latter. The dataset would attribute that cell to Ghana between 
1957 (when that country became independent) and 1960 (when Côte d’Ivoire did) because Côte d’Ivoire was then 
coded as missing. From 1960 onward, it would attribute the cell to Côte d’Ivoire. In that case, we attributed the cell 
to Côte d’Ivoire for all years. 
15 It is important to note that the geo-location of conflict is not based on specific conflict events. Instead, the 
database considers a conflict’s zone of influence—defined taking into account locations of reported armed encoun-
ters between the parties, territories occupied by the rebel side, and locations of rebel bases—and codes a grid cell 
as being part of that conflict if it overlaps with the smallest circle that circumscribes that zone (Hallberg 2012, 
221–22). If we are to think in terms of specific conflict events, the noise in measurement is thus much more likely to 
involve a  type-I error (i.e., coding an area as having conflict when no specific conflict events happened there) than  a 
type-II error. To the extent that measurement error would be a bigger issue farther from the capital, which is likely 
to be the case as news sources become sparser, this would tend to bias results against our findings. 
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on the nature of the connections between distance and conflict. The first placebo is 
to use interstate conflict (type “2”). For other distinctions, we match the  Prio-GRID 
data to the original conflict dataset from which it derives—namely, the UCDP/PRIO 
Armed Conflict Dataset (Gleditsch et al 2002, Themnér and Wallensteen 2014)—
which classifies the incompatibility motivating each conflict. In particular, it distin-
guishes between conflicts driven by disputes over the status of a territory, which in 
the case of intrastate conflicts is typically about secession or autonomy, and those 
driven by disputes over the type of political system, the replacement of the central 
government, or the change of its composition. We will henceforth refer to these as 
“territorial” and “government” conflicts and take the former to be a placebo case.
We will also look into differences in terms of conflict intensity. The UCDP/PRIO 
data define conflict as requiring a minimum of 25  battle-related deaths in a given 
year, but it distinguishes between “war” (at least 1,000  battle-related deaths) and 
“minor armed conflict” for the range between 25 and 1,000. It would be reasonable 
to assume that measurement error related to  underreporting would be less prevalent 
in  full-scale wars, so this provides us another window into the issue.
We will consider a second key conflict variable from the  PRIO-GRID dataset, 
namely  Onset (Gleditsch et al 2002, Strand 2006). This variable indicates for every 
 cell-year pair whether a conflict started in that  cell-year. It has the advantage of 
affording a longer time period, as it is coded for the years between 1946 and 2004, 
which will let us exploit the time variation more thoroughly. On the other hand, it 
refers to occurrences that are obviously a lot less frequent, which makes the data 
relatively sparse.
Conflict Is More Likely Closer to the Capital.—We first consider the evidence 
taking grid cells as the unit of analysis. More precisely, we estimate the following 
specification:
(5)  Y ic =  γ 0 +  γ 1 ×  LogDistCapital ic +  X ic Γ +  μ c +  ε ic ,
where  Y ic is a measure of conflict in grid cell  i in country  c . Note that we leave aside 
the time variation in the conflict variables, for the moment, to focus on the aver-
age probability of conflict in a cell, taken over the entire available period—namely, 
 1989–2008 for the occurrence of conflict ( CivConf ) and  1946–2005 for conflict 
onset ( Onset ). The variable  LogDistCapital stands for the log of distance from the 
grid cell to the capital city, and Result 1 is encapsulated in  γ 1 < 0 : the likelihood of 
conflict is smaller in cells that are farther from the capital. The term  X ic is a vector 
of control variables (also from the  PRIO-GRID dataset), which help us deal with a 
number of factors that may correlate with the likelihood of conflict: income per cap-
ita, population, and infant mortality as measures of  socioeconomic conditions, travel 
time to the nearest major city as a measure of broad isolation as well as urbanization, 
and a number of geographic characteristics (share of mountainous terrain and forest 
coverage,  latitude, average temperature, and precipitation).16 Finally,  μ c are country 
16 All of these variables are also averaged over the relevant period. 
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fixed effects, so that we focus on the variation within countries, and  ε ic is the error 
term. We cluster standard errors at the country level to allow for correlated shocks 
within countries.
The results are in Table 3. Column 1 shows the correlation between average 
CivConf and the measure of distance to the capital city for the full sample. We see no 
evidence of a link. However, column 2 shows that countries with an average Polity 
score below (or equal to) zero—a threshold meant to encompass “autocracies” and 
“closed anocracies” as defined by the Polity IV dataset—display a strong negative 
correlation: conflict is more likely in areas that are closer to the capital. In all cases, 
we control for the distance to the largest ( noncapital) city to address the concern 
that our results could be picking up an effect of isolation from large centers, as 
opposed to anything specific related to capital cities. The coefficient on that variable 
is relatively small and statistically insignificant, and column 3 further shows that it 
remains so if we look at it on its own.
This result is consistent with Result 1 from the model. Moreover, the placebo 
specification in column 4 shows that the relationship is absent in the sample of 
relatively democratic countries, as we would expect: the result holds only for coun-
tries where our logic of insurrections as a check on incumbent behavior ought to be 
more important. Quantitatively, our estimate of −0.0266 implies that halving the 
distance to the capital city would increase conflict probability by 1.8 percentage 
points ( = log (2 ) × 0.0266 ) or about 14.5 percent of 12.7 percentage points, the 
average probability of conflict per cell in this subsample. (The standard deviation 
Table 3—Distance to the Capital and Conflict
Dependent variable Average probability of conflict (CivConf ) Average probability of conflict onset (Onset)
Full Polity ≤ 0 Polity ≤ 0 Polity > 0 Full Polity ≤ 0 Polity ≤ 0 Polity > 0
Sample (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
log distance to capital −0.00138 −0.0266 0.00947 −0.000112 −0.000163 −5.45e-05
[0.00952] [0.0107] [0.0143] [5.15e-05] [8.00e-05] [3.70e-05]
log distance to largest 0.00325 0.00988 0.00590 −0.00495 8.81e-05 8.52e-05 6.79e-06 7.86e-05
 non-capital city [0.00568] [0.00707] [0.00692] [0.00969] [4.05e-05] [5.86e-05] [3.47e-05] [4.42e-05]
Full set controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 54,177 14,676 14,676 39,501 53,319 32,116 32,116 21,203
R2 0.828 0.869 0.865 0.793 0.045 0.046 0.044 0.046
Notes: Robust standard errors in brackets are clustered at the country level. Each observation represents a grid cell’s 
averages over time. Each column’s sample is determined by the average of the Polity score over the period where 
conflict data are available. Columns 1 to 4 use the indicator of ongoing conflicts in each cell, averaged from 1989 
to 2008 where conflict data are available. Columns 5 to 8 use the indicator of conflict onsets (the start of a new con-
flict) in each cell, averaged from 1946 to 2008 where conflict onset data are available. All columns include the aver-
ages over the corresponding period of the following variables for each cell: log gross cell products per capita (night 
luminosity-enhanced measures, available in 1990, 1995, 2000, and 2005), log population (available in 1990, 1995, 
2000, and 2005), temperature, precipitation, and cell size. In addition, all columns control for: log distance to the 
largest non-capital city, infant mortality rates, proportion of mountain area (all measured in 2000), log travel time 
to the nearest urban area, and cell latitude. Country fixed effects are included. Chi-squared test statistics of coeffi-
cient differences (from seemingly unrelated regressions) between columns 2 and 4 and between columns 6 and 8 
are respectively 4.14 ( p-value = 0.04) and 1.54 ( p-value = 0.21).
314 AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL: APPLIED ECONOMICS JULY 2019
of log  distance to the capital in this subsample is 0.87, corresponding to a change of 
distance by a factor of 2.39.)
The remainder of Table 3 considers conflict onset ( Onset ) as the dependent vari-
able and shows a similar pattern distinguishing autocracies and democracies. Note 
that now a correlation emerges even for the full sample (column 5). This is because 
the number of countries coded as autocracies is much larger for the period  1946–2005 
than for the period  1989–2008 for which the  CivConf variable is computed. Still, 
the pattern once again seems different between autocracies and  democracies, as the 
correlation holds only for the former.17 In addition, there is again no effect when 
using the distance to the largest ( noncapital) city. Quantitatively, the estimate of 
−0.000163 implies that, in autocracies, halving the distance to the capital city 
would increase the chances of conflict onset by 0.000113 or 1.38 times the mean of 
Onset in this sample.
The message comes into clearer focus when we break down the analysis accord-
ing to the different kinds of conflict. This is what we see in Table 4, where the focus 
is on the sample of autocracies and closed anocracies. Panel A focuses on the prob-
ability of conflict ( CivConf ), whereas panel B reproduces the same results using 
conflict onset ( Onset ), with broadly similar results. Columns 1 and 2 show that the 
link between conflict and distance to the capital is entirely driven by the government 
type: territorial conflicts display no significant link whatsoever with a coefficient 
that is much smaller in absolute value. This is again exactly in line with what we 
would expect from our framework.
Columns 3 and 4 break intrastate conflicts along a different dimension: strictly 
intrastate wars (coded as “3” in  PRIO-GRID) and internationalized intrastate wars 
(coded as “4”), respectively. We see that the result is driven entirely by the standard 
intrastate variety. Columns 5–6 in turn show that the result is present both in rela-
tively minor conflicts and  full-scale wars, in which the issue of measurement error 
should be less important. Last but not least, column 7 shows that there is no rela-
tionship between distance to the capital and interstate conflict. In sum, our placebo 
specifications confirm that conflict is more likely closer to the capital only in the 
types of conflict that better fit the logic of our framework.
One concern is that the pattern in Table 3 could be affected by measurement error, 
if conflict episodes that take place farther away from the capital are less likely to be 
noticed and recorded. Since measurement error should be less common in highly 
intense conflicts, the result in column 5 of Table 4 suggests that this is not the main 
driver of the relationship between conflict and the distance to the capital. This is also 
underscored by the placebo results of insignificant coefficients found in columns 2, 
4, and 7.
To further investigate this alternative explanation, we note that the key determi-
nant of potentially unrecorded battles and conflicts should be population density: 
conflict ought to be easily observed and recorded in densely populated areas. Based 
on this logic, we examine the relationship between distance to capital and conflict as 
17 Note, however, that the small number of episodes of conflict onset in countries coded as democratic, given 
the stringency of the criterion over the  1946–2005 period, means that we do not have enough precision to tell the 
coefficients apart statistically. 
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a  nonparametric function of population density ( LogDens ) in an augmented version 
of equation (5):  Y ic =  γ 0 (LogDen s ic ) +  γ 1 (LogDen s ic ) ×  LogDistCapital ic +  X ic Γ (LogDen s ic ) +  μ c +  ε ic . The function  γ 1 (LogDen s ic )  = ∂ Y ic /∂ LogDistCapita l ic is 
estimated in local linear regressions of this equation by different values of  LogDens 
and plotted in Figure 1. The effect is strong and significant across the broad range of 
population density, even for the most densely populated areas where measurement 
error should not be much of an issue with estimates close to the one found in column 
2 of Table 3.18 Measurement error is thus unlikely to account for our key results.19
18 We use the Epanechnikov kernel with a bandwidth of 0.5 times the range of  x . The observed pattern is similar 
across a broad range of  cross-validated bandwidths and different kernels (see Li and Racine 2006, ch. 2). 
19 Measurement error may still partly explain the effect found among less populated areas in Figure 1. However, 
this explanation is at odds with our similarly estimated effects of distance to the capital on conflict onsets, whose 
Table 4—Distance to the Capital and Different Types of Conflict
Sample Polity ≤ 0
Dependent variable of conflict type Government Territory
Strictly 
intrastate
Intrastate 
expanded Intense
Less 
intense Interstate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Panel A. Conflicts (CivConf)
log distance to capital −0.020 −0.00784 −0.0247 −0.00185 −0.0101 −0.0178 0.000683
[0.00940] [0.00590] [0.00904] [0.00297] [0.00543] [0.00834] [0.000732]
Full set controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 14,676 14,676 14,676 14,676 14,676 14,676 14,676
R2 0.849 0.893 0.850 0.928 0.866 0.863 0.680
Sample Polity ≤ 0
Dependent variable of onset type Government Territory
Strictly 
intrastate
Intrastate 
expanded Intense
Less 
intense Interstate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Panel B. Conflict onsets (Onsets) 
log distance to capital −0.000166 −3.88e-05 −0.000137 −2.69e-05 −7.47e-05 −0.000117 −3.88e-06
[7.46e-05] [4.55e-05] [6.82e-05] [2.81e-05] [4.02e-05] [6.05e-05] [3.91e-06]
Full set controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 32,116 32,116 32,116 32,116 32,116 32,116 32,116
R2 0.058 0.024 0.049 0.023 0.017 0.051 0.011
Notes: Robust standard errors in brackets are clustered at the country level. Panel A considers ongoing conflicts of 
different types from 1989 to 2008, and panel B considers onsets of different types of conflicts from 1946 to 2005. 
Each observation represents a grid cell’s averages over the corresponding period. The sample is restricted to the 
nonpositive average of the Polity score over the period where the corresponding measure of conflicts or conflict 
onsets are available. The dependent variable is the indicator of ongoing conflicts, or onsets, of a particular conflict 
type in each cell. Columns 1 and 2 distinguish between conflicts arising from the incompatibility of government 
versus territory. Columns 3 and 4 distinguish between strictly intrastate conflicts and other intrastate conflicts in 
which other state(s) later intervene(s). Columns 5 and 6 distinguish between conflicts of at least 1,000 estimated 
casualties and the less intense ones. Column 7 uses interstate conflicts only. All columns include the averages over 
the corresponding period of the following variables for each cell: log gross cell products per capita (night luminos-
ity-enhanced measures, available in 1990, 1995, 2000, and 2005), log population (available in 1990, 1995, 2000, 
and 2005), temperature, precipitation, and cell size. In addition, all columns control for: infant mortality rates, pro-
portion of mountain area (all measured in 2000), log distance to the largest non-capital city, log travel time to the 
nearest urban area, and cell latitude. Country fixed effects are included.
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Conflict Becomes More Likely When the Capital Is Moved Closer.—A different 
look at the link between distance to the capital and conflict comes from exploiting 
the variation over time in the conflict data. Generally speaking, distance to the cap-
ital is constant for a given grid cell, but there are two important kinds of exception 
to this rule, which afford us some variation over time. First, when the same grid 
cell becomes part of a different country, the relevant capital city changes as a result. 
Second, the same is true when a given country changes its capital. To the extent 
that these events are uncorrelated with  time-variant  grid-cell characteristics, we can 
consider the effects of those  quasi-random “treatments” of changing distance to the 
capital.
To better understand the nature of the variation, Table 5 lists the countries con-
taining grid cells where distance to the capital is not a constant value over the years 
in our dataset. We see four distinct groups of countries. First, the former Soviet 
Union and Yugoslavia illustrate the two major episodes of country breakups. A third 
group of countries comprises those that moved their capital cities over the period 
of analysis. The remainder (Other) is a mixture of country breakups, reunifications, 
and changing borders. In the online Appendix, we show that the results that fol-
low remain qualitatively unaffected when we drop each of these groups at a time. 
(Of note, the estimated coefficient also remains essentially unchanged if we instead 
focus exclusively on the small subsample of countries that moved capital cities, 
though standard errors are much larger.) This reassures us that our findings are not 
driven by the specificities of each subgroup.
 nonparametric graph is shown in the online Appendix. The effect on conflict onset is present and strong only in 
more densely populated areas. 
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−0.02
0
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Effect of log distance to capital on average probability of conflict
95% confidence interval
Distance-to-capital effect on conflicts by population density
Figure 1. Effect of log Distance to Capital on Conflicts as a Function of log Population Density
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We thus implement specifications with  grid-cell fixed effects, focusing on conflict 
onset because of the longer time dimension in the panel.20 Specifically, we estimate
(6)  Y ict =  λ 0 +  λ 1 ×  LogDistCapital ict +  W ict Λ +  ν i +  ω t +  ε ict ,
where  t now indexes a given year. Our specifications will also include year fixed 
effects, which should account for factors that affect all countries in a given period, 
such as the end of the Cold War, and we again cluster the standard errors at the 
country level. Any  time-invariant characteristics are picked up by the  grid-cell fixed 
effects  ν i , so our vector of control variables  W ict now includes  time-variant factors 
available on a yearly basis: (log) distance to border, temperature, and precipitation. 
This helps us control for climate shocks, which have been flagged as relevant in 
the conflict literature (Miguel, Satyanath, and Sergenti 2004; Burke et al. 2009; 
Brückner and Ciccone 2011; Couttenier and Soubeyran 2014).
20 When it comes to the average probability of conflict,  CivConf , we are left with little of the relevant variation: 
starting the sample in 1989 leaves out the vast majority of  premove observations—not only for the  ex-USSR and 
 ex-Yugoslavia, but for a number of countries in the other two categories in Table 5 as well. Not surprisingly, the 
results are entirely inconclusive (available upon request). 
Table 5—Understanding the Sources of Variation: Countries Containing Grid Cells with 
Changing Distance to the Capital
Soviet Union Yugoslavia Changes in capital cities Other
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Armenia Bosnia and Herzegovina Brazil Bangladesh 
Azerbaijan Croatia China Czechoslovakia 
Belarus Kosovo Cote d’Ivoire Egypt 
Estonia FYR Macedonia Germanya Eritrea 
Georgia Montenegro Kazakhstana Ethiopia 
Kazakhstana Slovenia Myanmar Germanya 
Kyrgyzstan Yugoslavia Malawi Israel 
Latvia Nigeria Namibia 
Lithuania Pakistana Pakistana 
Moldova Tanzania Romania 
Russia South Vietnam
Tajikistan South Yemen 
Turkmenistan Slovakia 
Ukraine Syria 
Uzbekistan Vietnam 
Yemen 
Notes: To construct this table, we first flag the grid cells for which the measure of distance to the capital is not the 
same for all years in the sample. We then tabulate the countries to which at least one of these grid cells was assigned, 
considering all years. For instance, a cell in the Sinai Peninsula is attributed to Israel (between 1967 and 1979) 
and Egypt (other years).
a Germany, Kazakhstan, and Pakistan all experienced one change of capital and one breakup/reunification.
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Table 6 presents the results, distinguishing between the different kinds of conflict 
explored in Table 4. Column 1 shows that the onset of intrastate conflict becomes 
less likely in the  nondemocratic subsample when the capital is moved farther away 
from a grid cell. Quantitatively, the estimate of −0.000353 among  nondemocratic 
countries implies that halving the distance to the capital city would increase con-
flict onset probability by 0.000245, about twice the magnitude we found in the 
 cross-sectional analysis in Table 3.
Columns 2–6 then show that the connection between distance and conflict onset is 
driven by government, purely intrastate conflicts: it is statistically insignificant and/
or quantitatively very small in territorial intrastate, internationalized intrastate, and 
interstate conflicts.21 In addition, the subsample of relatively democratic countries 
displays a coefficient that is positive and quantitatively rather small (column 7). This 
is again reassuring that the mechanism is consistent with the logic we emphasize.
The panel specification does have drawbacks. First, the variation is coming from 
a small set of countries, which makes it more remarkable that we find robust results, 
but also raises natural questions about external validity. Second, we have a reduced 
set of available  time-varying control variables. For instance, we cannot control for 
population, since the data are available only for a small subset of years, and as such, 
the effect we find in Table 6 could be partly driven by population being drawn to a 
certain area once it becomes closer to the capital city.
21 Results for subsets of more/less intense conflicts are similar and omitted due to space constraints. They are 
available upon request. 
Table 6—Changes in Distance to the Capital and Conflict: Within-Cell Regressions
Sample Polity ≤ 0, 1946–2005 
Polity > 0, 
1946–2005
Polity ≤ 0,
[−5, +5] of cap. change 
Dependent variable 
 of onset type 
All 
intrastate Government Territory
Strictly 
intrastate
Intrastate 
expanded Interstate
All 
intrastate Government
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
log distance −0.000353 −0.000267 −0.000139 −0.000289 −6.40e-05 1.02e-06 2.96e-05 −0.000589 −0.000475
 to capital [0.000154] [0.000122] [8.93e-05] [0.000144] [3.77e-05] [1.12e-06] [1.13e-05] [0.000290] [0.000283]
Full set controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cell FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Extra control Yes
Observations 1,914,640 1,914,640 1,914,640 1,914,640 1,914,640 1,914,640 1,467,596 88,215 88,215
R2 0.037 0.032 0.040 0.037 0.024 0.026 0.030 0.120 0.120
Notes: Robust standard errors in brackets are clustered at the country level. Each observation represents a grid cell 
× year. Each column’s sample is determined by the average of the Polity score over the period 1946–2005, where 
conflict onset data are available. The dependent variable is the indicator of conflict onsets of conflicts of a particu-
lar type in each cell. Column 1 uses all intrastate conflicts. Columns 2 and 3 distinguish between conflicts arising 
from the incompatibility of government versus territory. Columns 4 and 5 distinguish between strictly intrastate 
conflicts and other intrastate conflicts in which other state(s) later intervene(s). Column 6 uses interstate conflicts 
only. Column 7 considers all countries with the positive average Polity score. Columns 8 and 9 consider cells that 
have experienced a change of the relevant capital city and restrict the sample to within five years of the capital city 
change. Grid-cell fixed effects and year fixed effects are included. Control variables include log distance to the bor-
der, temperature, and precipitation. Column 9 further controls for full interactions of the average log distance from 
all cells in a country × pre/post-capital change dummy.
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One way to assuage these concerns is to restrict our attention to a relatively short 
window around the changes in borders or capital city. If the results were driven by 
changes in cell characteristics such as population or GDP per capita that follow such 
an event, one might expect that it should take a reasonably long period for these 
changes to translate into the onset of conflict. Column 8 thus restricts the sample to 
within five years before and after the change in distance to the capital. The associa-
tion between the onset of government conflicts and distance to the capital is actually 
even stronger within this short window, suggesting that the effect does not come 
from relatively  slow-changing factors such as population size.
In addition, one might speculate that changes in capital cities, not being random 
events, could correlate systematically with conflict. For instance, it could be that 
conflict becomes more likely after a breakup episode, and it stands to reason that the 
average distance to the capital would fall as a country splits into smaller ones, which 
could bias the results toward finding support for our model. We would argue that 
this is unlikely to drive the results: it seems more natural to think that the conflicts 
surrounding partition would be more likely to be categorized as interstate (or “inter-
nationalized” intrastate) or at least territorial conflicts. This is hard to square off with 
the fact that our results are strongest for conflicts around government. Similarly, 
when it comes to moving the capital city, it seems natural that a ruler’s incentives 
would most likely be toward moving the capital to places where conflict would be 
intrinsically less, not more, likely.
To deal with this concern more directly, we estimate the following alternative 
specification:
(7)  Y ict =  λ 0 +  λ 1 ×  LogDistCapital ict +  λ 2 ×  ‾  LogDistCapital ct ×  PostChang e it 
  +  λ 3 ×  PostChang e it  +  W ict Λ +  ν i +  ω t +  ε ict ,
where  ‾  LogDistCapital ct is the average distance to the capital among all cells in 
country  c in year  t , and  PostChang e it is a dummy equal to one if  t is any year after 
a change in the distance between cell  i and the capital city. This controls for a break 
in the relationship between distance and conflict following a change in the capital. 
Column 9 displays the result: we again see a significant effect of larger magnitude, 
albeit less precisely estimated.
Finally, it is reassuring that the results we find here are in line with what we 
had obtained using the  cross-sectional variation in Tables 3 and 4. In addition, 
and as before, it also seems unlikely that whatever biases may be in play would 
generate results only in the types of conflict that pertain to our story. In sum, while 
the appropriate caveats lead us to refrain from attaching a causal interpretation to 
any of our estimates, the body of evidence suggests that our mechanism is qual-
itatively and quantitatively important in understanding the spatial distribution of 
conflict.
Conflict Is More Dangerous Closer to the Capital.—We then turn to Remark 2, 
namely that conflict that happens closer to the capital is more likely to dislodge 
the incumbent regime. For that, we adapt our panel strategy, as in (6), using the 
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 following specification, connecting the  country-level RegimeChange outcome and 
the  grid-cell-level data on conflict and distance:22
(8)  RegimeChang e ct =  β 0 +  β 1 ×  Y ict ×  DistCapital ict +  β 2i ×  Y ict 
 +  β 3 ×  DistCapital ict +  W ict Λ +  ν i +  ω t +  ε ict ,
where  RegimeChang e ct is an indicator of whether there is a change in regime in 
country  c , as coded in the Polity IV dataset, in the  five-year interval after year  t .23 
Result 2 entails  β 1 < 0 : as a grid cell becomes more distant from the capital, the 
connection between conflict in that cell and subsequent RegimeChange gets weaker.
The specification includes interactions of  cell-specific coefficients ( β 2i ) with 
the conflict variable ( Y ict ) to control for any observed or unobserved  time-variant 
cell characteristics that could govern how conflict in that cell may affect regime 
change.24 The identification of  β 1 thus comes, again, from changes in borders and 
capital cities. We again focus on  Onset as the key conflict variable in order to maxi-
mize the relevant variation and cluster the standard errors at the country level, which 
22 This is similar to Iyigun, Nunn, and Qian (2017), who consider state size as an  aggregate-level variable and 
how it relates with  grid-cell-level data on conflict and agricultural productivity. 
23 Specifically, as described in greater detail in the online Data Appendix, we use the variable “Regime 
Transition,” which is coded as a significant (at least  three-point) change in the polity’s democracy or autocracy 
score. The idea is to capture more profound changes in the political system as distinct from, say, changes in the 
identity or party of the leader. 
24 This specification is equivalent to one with group fixed effects with groups defined by the cell interacted with 
the conflict status. 
Table 7—Conflict Onset and Regime Change
Sample Polity ≤ 0
Dependent variable:  
 RegimeChange within 
  five years
Indicator
(1)
Indicator
(2)
Indicator
(3)
Average
(4)
Indicator
(5)
Indicator
(6)
Type of conflict onset Government Government Government Government Intense Territory
Onset × log distance −0.321 −0.375 −0.463 −0.129 −0.321 0.0611
      to capital [0.0598] [0.0340] [0.0701] [0.0108] [0.0597] [0.361]
Full set controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
(Cell × Onset) FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Additional controls Country-specific 
time trends
(Cell × Onset 
× country) FEs
Observations 1,913,481 1,913,481 1,913,481 1,913,481 1,913,481 1,913,481
R2 0.292 0.404 0.302 0.363 0.292 0.292
Notes: Robust standard errors in brackets are clustered at the country level. Each observation represents a grid cell 
× year over the period from 1946 to 2005 where conflict onset data are available. The sample is restricted to coun-
tries with the nonpositive averaged Polity score. In columns 1, 2, 3, 5, and 6, the dependent variable is the indica-
tor of RegimeChange within five years associated with the cell, while column 4 uses the average of RegimeChange 
within five years. All columns control for fixed effects at the level of cells interacted with the onset dummy (see text 
for interpretation), year fixed effects, log distance to capital, and log distance to the border, temperature, and precip-
itation. In addition, column 2 controls for country fixed effects interacted with time trends, and column 3 controls 
for fixed effects at the level of cells interacted with countries interacted with the onset dummy. Columns 1 to 4 use 
conflicts arising from the incompatibility of government. Column 5 uses intense conflicts, namely those of at least 
1,000 estimated casualties. Column 6 uses conflicts arising from the incompatibility of territory. 
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is particularly relevant since the variation on the outcome variable occurs at that 
level.
Table 7 shows the results, focusing on the sample of  nondemocracies. The evi-
dence is again in accordance with the model. Column 1 shows that, if the capital is 
moved farther away from a grid cell, the link between the onset of conflict related to 
government, in that grid cell, and the likelihood of subsequent RegimeChange in the 
country gets weaker. This is true even if we control for  country-specific time trends 
(column 2) or the interaction of  Onset with  cell-country fixed effects (instead of cell 
fixed effects) (column 3), which leaves aside the variation coming from cells that 
change countries. The result is also similar if we measure  RegimeChange not with 
an indicator but with the average over the subsequent  five-year period (column 4) or 
if we focus our attention on intense conflict (column 5).
As we have noted, it is less obvious that all of our aforementioned placebos would 
be meaningful in this case—it is plausible that interstate conflict, for instance, could 
also be destabilizing for an incumbent regime and more so if it happens to emerge 
close to the capital. Still, it is interesting to see that conflicts over territory do not 
display the same pattern (column 6).
This specific result is important, especially since the spatial distribution of con-
flict is clearly endogenous. In particular, reverse causality is a concern: it could be 
the case that the very fact that a regime is wobbling would lead to more conflict 
arising closer to the capital. In the absence of a source of exogenous variation, it is 
reassuring that we find no significant link between RegimeChange, distance, and 
territorial conflict.25 After all, it stands to reason that reverse causality should affect 
that type of conflict as well.
In sum, although we again refrain from any causal interpretation for our estimates, 
the evidence suggests that the danger posed by conflict to incumbent regimes, in 
 nondemocratic countries, is weaker the farther away the capital city is moved from 
where that conflict emerges, in line with Result 2.
B. Capital Cities and Quality of Governance
Data.—In order to measure quality of governance across countries, we resort to 
the  well-known and widely used Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) from 
the World Bank (Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi 2010). They aggregate informa-
tion from a number of different sources ranging from surveys of households and 
firms to assessments from NGOs, commercial providers, and public organizations 
into six different measures: Rule of Law, Voice and Accountability, Government 
Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality, Control of Corruption, and Political Stability. 
Since the  year-to-year variation in the quality of governance measures is not very 
meaningful, we will average them over time for the entire period for which the 
WGI are available ( 1996–2012,  biannually until 2002). To make things as simple as 
possible, and making use of the fact that these individual measures are very highly 
25 We have experimented with weather and climate shocks as possible instruments to deal with that reverse 
causality, although these would not assuage all concerns with omitted variables. In any case, the first stage fails to 
work: climate shocks do not predict conflict onset in this context, consistent with Couttenier and Soubeyran (2014). 
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correlated with one another, we will summarize them in a single number, using the 
first principal component of the six measures taken together.26
When it comes to measuring how isolated a capital city is, we use the axiomati-
cally grounded family of measures of spatial concentration (or equivalently, isola-
tion) around a point of interest proposed in Campante and Do (2009). Specifically, 
they show that a very simple and easily interpretable measure of isolation has a 
number of desirable properties (and uniquely so): the average log distance to the 
capital city—which for shorthand, we will describe as  AvgLogDistance .27
We compute the measure using the database Gridded Population of the World 
(GPW), Version 3 from the  Socio-Economic Data Center (SEDC) at Columbia 
University. This dataset, published in 2005, contains the information for the years 
1990, 1995, and 2000 and is arguably the most detailed world population map avail-
able. Over the course of more than 10 years, these data are gathered from national 
censuses and transformed into a global grid of 2.5  arc-minute side cells (approxi-
mately 5 km or 3 miles) with data on population for each of the cells in this grid. As 
it turns out, the autocorrelation in the measure of population concentration is very 
high across the  ten-year period in question. For this reason, we choose to focus on 
AvgLogDistance as computed for the one year, 1990, that is judged by the SEDC as 
having the highest data quality. 28
We focus on a measure of distance that adjusts for the geographical size of the 
country to allow for the possibility that a given distance could mean different things 
in countries that are geographically small or large: 100 miles could be seen as a long 
distance in Belgium, but not so much in Canada. That said, we will also look at a 
version that does not adjust for geographical size, for the sake of robustness.
Isolated Capital Cities and Misgovernance.—The raw data, as displayed in 
Figure 2, show a negative correlation between the first principal component of 
the six WGI governance measures and  AvgLogDistance , our benchmark measure 
of isolation. For more systematic evidence, we consider the following regression 
specification:
(9)  Y c =  γ 0 +  γ 1 ×  AvgLogDistance c +  X c Γ +  ε c ,
where  Y c stands for the measure of quality of governance, and  X c is a vector of 
control variables that are often associated with governance—ranging from GDP per 
capita, urbanization, and population, to ethnic fractionalization and  characteristics of 
26 The correlation between the different average measures in our sample of 178 countries is never below  0.73 , 
and typically far above  0.8 . The  Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin overall measure of sampling adequacy is 0.896, indicating that 
a principal components analysis is warranted. 
27 See Campante and Do (2009, 2014) for a more extensive discussion. A description of the index as we actually 
compute it in practice, given the data we have, can be found in the online Data Appendix. An important practical 
issue refers to how we deal with countries that have multiple capitals. The online Data Appendix documents how 
we deal with these issues, but in any case, the results are unaffected by any of these choices. 
28 We limit our analysis to countries with more than one million inhabitants, since most of the examples with 
extremely high levels of concentration come from small countries and islands. In addition, all of our analysis will 
exclude Mauritius because it is an outlier in terms of the concentration of population. As it turns out, our results are 
made stronger by its inclusion, so we want to make sure that nothing is driven by this specific case. 
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the political system (such as the presence of majoritarian elections or of a presiden-
tial system), as well as regional and legal origin dummies.29 (All control  variables 
29 Our results are also robust to including educational achievement as a control variable, as measured by the 
total years of schooling in 1995 (from the  Barro-Lee dataset). We choose not to include it in our main specifications 
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Figure 2. Governance and Isolation of the Capital City
Table 8—Isolated Capital Cities and Misgovernance
Full sample Autocracies Establ. democracies Full sample
Dependent variable: WGI PC (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
AvgLogDistance −0.1610 −0.1430 −0.2670 −0.3219 −0.0585 −0.0095 −0.0592 −0.0584
[0.057] [0.054] [0.066] [0.049] [0.121] [0.137] [0.064] [0.064]
AvgLogDistance × autocracy −0.2316 −0.2420
[0.081] [0.082]
Basic set of controls – – – –
Full set of controls – – – –
Selection-corrected bound −0.137 −0.124 −0.260 −0.338 −0.207 −0.235
Observations 127 127 36 36 31 31 127 127
R2 0.823 0.830 0.829 0.884 0.898 0.916 0.869 0.870
Notes: Robust standard errors are in brackets. The z-scores (normalized variables) are reported. WGI PC: First 
Principal Component of Worldwide Governance Indicators measures (rule of law, voice and accountability, gov-
ernment effectiveness, regulatory quality, control of corruption, and political stability) are shown. For autocracies, 
Polity ≤ 0;  for established democracies, Polity > 9. Basic control variables include log GDP per capita, log pop-
ulation, urbanization, and region and legal origin dummies. Full set of controls adds majoritarian and presiden-
tial system dummies, and ethnic fractionalization. Columns 7–8 also include the autocracy dummy as the control 
variable. Conservative bounds of effects are calculated following Oster (forthcoming) and Altonji et al. (2005) in 
assuming equal selection on observables and selection on unobservables. Also,  χ 2 test statistics of coefficient dif-
ferences (from seemingly unrelated regressions) between columns 3 and 5 and between columns 4 and 6 are respec-
tively 3.21 ( p-value = 0.07) and 9.46 ( p-value = 0.00).
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in our analysis are averaged over the same period for which the governance measure 
is calculated,  1996–2006, unless noted otherwise.)
The results are in Table 8. (All tables henceforth report coefficients estimated for 
the standardized variables, so that they should be interpreted in terms of standard 
deviations, as computed for the full sample.) Columns 1–2 confirm the message 
from the raw correlation. The correlation is statistically significant, and robust to the 
inclusion of the vector  X c of control variables.
As it turns out, this broad pattern again masks differences between democracies 
and  nondemocracies, as suggested by the theory. To see this, we can again focus on 
the threshold of a Polity score equal to zero, which here translates roughly into the 
bottom tercile of our sample, and compare it with the set of  full-fledged, established 
democracies, as defined by a Polity score above 9. Figure 3 shows the scatterplots 
for the two subsamples: there is essentially no correlation in the group of established 
democracies, whereas a negative association emerges in the sample of autocracies.30
This central message is underscored by the systematic evidence in the remain-
der of Table 8. Columns 3–4 show that the negative correlation between isolated 
capitals and the quality of governance is indeed particularly pronounced in the 
 nondemocratic countries in spite of the relatively small sample size. This pattern 
is in stark contrast with columns 5–6, which show that the correlation is essen-
tially  nonexistent in countries with established democracies. In fact, in spite of the 
relatively high standard errors, especially in the sample of democracies, we can 
specifically reject the hypothesis of equality of coefficients on the concentration 
of population around the capital across the two subsamples (  p-value =  0.0018 ). 
Last but not least, columns 7–8 show that the same message is conveyed by the 
because it is very highly correlated with income per capita (around  0.75 in the full sample) and ends up being statis-
tically insignificant in all specifications. The results are also unaltered if we control directly for population density, 
which we do not do in the main specifications because we already include a control for population and the adjust-
ment for country size implicit in our measure of concentration. Last but not least, the results are robust to including a 
comprehensive set of geographical and historical control variables, including an island dummy, length of coastline, 
date of independence, and presence of natural resources. All of these can be seen in the online Appendix. 
30 The correlation, as well as all the regression results that follow, is robust to the exclusion of Singapore, which 
seems to be an outlier in terms of governance among the countries in this subsample. 
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Figure 3. Governance and Isolation of the Capital City: Autocracies versus Established Democracies
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full sample if we include an interaction term between the isolation measure and an 
autocracy dummy. Put simply, as in the model, isolated capitals are associated with 
misgovernance.31
The same pattern can be seen using a more flexible,  semi-parametric approach. 
Specifically, we can model the potentially heterogeneous relationship between the 
isolation of the capital and the quality of governance as a  nonparametric function of 
the Polity measure (denoted as  p ):  WGI c = α(  p c ) + β(  p c ) ×  AvgLogDistance c +  X c  Γ(  p c ) +  ϵ c , where  X c stands for the basic control variables as in column 1 of 
Table 7. The function  β(  p c ) = ∂ WG I c /∂ AvgLogDistanc e c is estimated in local lin-
ear regressions of this equation by different values of  p .32 The resulting function is 
plotted in Figure 4. We can see a pattern in which a significant negative coefficient is 
found for relatively autocratic countries at the lower end of the range, while for the 
more democratic countries the coefficients are much smaller in absolute value and 
statistically indistinguishable from zero. Notably, the threshold falls right around the 
31 This result is also robust when isolation is measured using the actual driving distance (or driving time) as 
computed from Google Maps (see the online Appendix). We prefer the “ as-the-crow-flies” distances, though, since 
road distances and quality can be affected both by the incentive to evade accountability but also by overall state 
capacity. As a result of that, the  driving-based measures tend to display smaller coefficient magnitudes, as can be 
seen in the online Appendix Tables E6 and E7. 
32 We use the Epanechnikov kernel with a bandwidth of 0.5 the range of  p . The observed pattern is much similar 
across a wide range of  cross-validated bandwidths (see Li and Racine 2006, ch. 2). 
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Polity score of zero that separates the regimes classified as autocracies and closed 
anocracies.
These are not causal estimates of the impact of increasing isolation, of course, and 
our theory itself is explicit about the presence of reverse causality. Still, to provide 
reassurance that the correlation we find is not spurious, the table also shows that 
the results are robust to correcting for selection on unobservables, following Oster’s 
(forthcoming) procedure (in the spirit of Altonji, Elder, and Taber 2005) assuming 
that there is as much selection on unobservables as there is selection on observables.33
Alternatively, we also implement the potential source of exogenous variation 
used, in the context of US states, by Campante and Do (2014): the location of a 
country’s centroid. The results can be seen in the online Appendix, which displays 
 first-stage and 2SLS/IV estimates for the specifications in Table 8, with the aver-
age log distance of population with respect to the centroid ( AvgLogDistanc e cent ) 
instrumenting for  AvgLogDistance . The  full-sample results are robust even with 
 weak-IV-robust inference, but the IV is indeed rather weak.34 To understand why 
this is the case, note that the  first stage is absent in the subsample of autocratic 
countries. This is not surprising: the equanimous, republican logic of locating the 
capital at a relatively central position, which underlies the  first-stage relationship 
across US states, was bound to be much less influential to the decisions of autocrats 
and/or colonial powers concerning the designation of the capital.35 In contrast, the 
 first-stage coefficient is considerably larger in the sample of democracies, but in that 
case, consistent with our theory, there is no impact of isolation on governance. All in 
all, while we still refrain from any causal interpretation of the estimates, the balance 
of evidence increases confidence that the relationship we find is not spurious.
With the appropriate causality caveats, we can also assess the quantitative impor-
tance of the correlation. Since we report standardized results, it is easy to interpret 
the coefficients in Table 8: a  one-standard-deviation increase in the isolation of the 
capital (computed over the distribution for the entire sample) is associated with a 
decrease in the measured quality of governance of just over 0.3 standard deviations in 
the context of the full specification for the  nondemocratic subsample (column 4). To 
make this more concrete, consider the thought experiment of increasing the isolation 
of the capital from about average among autocracies (approximately that of Nairobi 
in Kenya) to one standard deviation above it (roughly that of Sudan’s Khartoum). 
As it turns out, the quality of governance in Kenya is also measured as about aver-
age for our sample of autocracies, whereas Sudan’s is among the very worst in the 
world—better only than Iraq, Afghanistan, and Liberia. The estimated coefficient 
suggests that the increase in isolation would be associated with a decrease in the 
quality of governance that corresponds to about 40 percent of the actual difference 
33 Both Oster (forthcoming) and Altonji, Elder, and Taber (2005) argue that, in practice, selection on observ-
ables is expected to be of a smaller magnitude than selection on unobservables, in which case our results should be 
even more robust to omitted variable bias. 
34 The online Appendix also shows results using two other potential instruments, namely  AvgLogDistanc e cent 
with respect to the distribution of land suitability and  AvgLogDistanc e cent with respect to the uniform distribution 
across a country’s cells. As expected, those instruments are even weaker. 
35 As noted by Herbst (2000, 16), with respect to Africa, “[most] colonial capitals were located on the coast, 
demonstrating the low priority of extending power inland compared to the need for easy communication and trans-
port links with Europe.” These capitals by and large persisted as such after independence. 
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between the two countries. This suggests that the mechanism linking accountability 
and isolation via the threat of conflict is important from a quantitative perspective.
Robustness.—The association between isolated capital cities and poor gover-
nance, as well as the fact that it is present only in relatively  nondemocratic contexts, 
also holds under different ways of measuring the degree of isolation of the capital 
and the quality of governance.
We consider three alternative measures of isolation: (i) the “unadjusted” version 
of  AvgLogDistance ; (ii) the (log of the) distance between the actual capital and the 
least isolated place in the country;36 and (iii) capital primacy, namely the share of 
the country’s population living in the capital city as officially delimited, which is an 
inverse measure of isolation. The pairwise correlations between these variables and 
(adjusted)  AvgLogDistance in our sample—0.62, 0.59, and −0.37, respectively—
clearly show that the measures are related, as expected, but substantially different 
nonetheless. In particular, capital primacy is a rather unsatisfactory measure, as it 
relies on arbitrary definitions of what counts as the capital city and discards all the 
information on the spatial distribution outside of that arbitrarily delimited city, and 
the lower correlation underscores that it is indeed noisier. Still, it is sufficiently com-
mon so as to warrant checking for the sake of completeness. As for the quality of 
governance, we use another measure, the Rule of Law index compiled by Freedom 
House, which also gives us a sufficiently wide coverage in terms of the number of 
countries—and particularly of  nondemocratic ones. (We rescale the index so that 
higher scores correspond to better governance.)
The results are shown in Table 9. Columns 1–4 reproduce the specifications for 
autocracies and established democracies, respectively from columns 4 and 6 in 
Table 8, but looking at unadjusted  AvgLogDistance and the distance to the least 
isolated place, respectively, as key independent variables. In both cases, we see a 
similar negative, statistically significant correlation between isolated capital cities 
and quality of governance for the autocracy subsample only. Note that the results are 
not too far, quantitatively speaking, from what we found in our baseline.
Columns 5–6 then consider the coarser measure, capital primacy. Unfortunately, 
our data on capital city populations are considerably more sparse, so in order to 
obtain reasonable sample sizes, we consider an “autocracy” threshold at the median 
Polity score in our distribution (equal to six). This includes what the Polity dataset 
classifies as “open anocracies” (Polity score between zero and five), as well as a 
few less established “democracies.” We see a positive coefficient ( p-value: 0.122), 
only for the subsample of autocracies (column 3). Note also that the estimated coef-
ficients are considerably smaller and less precisely estimated, consistent with the 
substantial measurement error being introduced by the coarseness of the measure.
In addition, columns 7–8 repeat the same exercise with the Freedom House 
measure of governance—reverting back to using our standard zero threshold for 
36 Notably, for most countries, the least isolated location is the country’s largest city, which often turns out to 
be the capital city itself. The exceptions are illustrative: in China, it is close to Zhengzhou, the largest city in that 
country’s most populous province (Henan), and similarly for India, where it is also in the most populous state (Uttar 
Pradesh). In the United States, it is Columbus, Ohio, right in the middle of the large population concentrations of 
the East Coast and the Midwest. 
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 autocracies and  AvgLogDistance as our key independent variable. The results are 
very much consistent, which is unsurprising given that the measures of governance 
are very highly correlated (in excess of 0.80). Still, and particularly with our small 
samples, it is reassuring to learn that the results are not very sensitive to that choice 
of measures.
The last column in Table 9 then addresses a different robustness exercise: whether 
the results are indeed driven by the role of the capital city itself, as opposed to other 
correlated features of the spatial distribution of population. Specifically, it could be 
that relatively isolated capital cities often correspond to the existence of a major eco-
nomic center away from the capital, like Istanbul or São Paulo or Lagos. This could 
be associated with another elite based in that other city, which might be conducive 
to misgovernance in different ways—say, through their own predatory behavior or 
through disputes with the political elites situated in the capital. In order to check that 
our results are not driven by this type of mechanism, we compute our measure of 
isolation  AvgLogDistance with respect to the largest city in each country, other than 
the capital itself (as of 2000).37 Column 9 shows, using a specification akin to that 
37 This is either the country’s largest city or, more often, its second largest, since the capital is also the largest 
city in about five out of six countries. The correlation between the measure and the isolation of the capital city is 
Table 9—Isolated Capital Cities and Misgovernance: Robustness
Dependent variable WGI PC WGI PC WGI PC
WGI 
PC
WGI 
PC WGI PC FH FH WGI PC(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Auto-
cracies
Demo-
cracies
Auto-
cracies
Demo-
cracies
Auto-
cracies
Demo-
cracies
Auto-
cracies
Demo-
cracies
Full 
sample
AvgLogDistance (unadj.) −0.4499 0.1018
[0.115] [0.308]
Distance min. isolation −0.2277 0.0364
[0.058] [0.082]
Capital primacy 0.1137 −0.1679
[0.070] [0.076]
AvgLogDistance −0.2009 0.0066 −0.0057
[0.080] [0.025] [0.070]
AvgLogDistance × autocracy −0.2736
[0.096]
AvgLogDistance (other largest) −0.1489
[0.081]
AvgLogDistance (other largest) × 
 autocracy
0.0714
[0.116]
Selection-corrected bound −0.474 −0.244 0.0783 −0.227 −0.272
Observations 36 31 34 31 32 31 35 29 126
R2 0.859 0.918 0.846 0.918 0.846 0.928 0.611 0.891 0.877
Notes: Robust standard errors are in brackets. The z-scores (normalized variables) are reported. WGI PC (col-
umns 1–6 and 9): First Principal Component of Worldwide Governance Indicators measures (rule of law, voice 
and accountability, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, control of corruption, and political stability) are 
shown. FH (columns 7–8): Freedom House Rule of Law Index is displayed. For autocracies, Polity ≤ 0, except for 
column 5 where the threshold is the median Polity score (≤ 6); for established democracies, Polity > 9. Control 
variables are log GDP per capita, log population, urbanization, and region and legal origin dummies, majoritar-
ian and presidential system dummies, ethnic fractionalization, and log land area and maximum distance in the 
country (log of maximum distance (in km) between capital city and any point in the country) for columns 1–4 
only. Column 9 also includes the autocracy dummy as the control variable. Columns 1, 3, 5, 7, and 9 show the 
bound from zero with Oster’s (forthcoming) correction when the selection by unobservables equals the selection 
by observables.
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of column 8 in Table 6, that our results are essentially unaffected, qualitatively or 
quantitatively, when we control for the degree of isolation of the other largest city.38 
This suggests that what we find indeed relates to the special role of the capital city.
Unpacking Governance.—We can further assess the reach of the explanatory 
power of the theory by unpacking the different dimensions that go into measures 
of governance. Consider first the different component measures of the WGI. As we 
have noted, the six measures are highly correlated with one another, and in light 
of that, one might expect that they would display a similar relationship with the 
isolation of the capital if considered separately. As it turns out, this is true of five 
of the six measures, but not for Political Stability. Panel A in Figure 5 shows that 
the coefficients obtained from local linear regressions are statistically indistinguish-
able from zero, and with no apparent difference with respect to autocracies versus 
democracies. This suggests that isolated capital cities are associated with worse 
governance across all dimensions, except that they are not linked to the political 
system being less stable.39
This is not surprising when looked at through the lens of our framework, in which 
isolating the capital city is a  rebellion-preventing measure. In fact, we have pointed 
out that the simple version of the model in which we take isolation and governance 
as exogenous implies that more isolated capitals are associated with less conflict 
and less risk for incumbent elites. Once we consider the interaction between polit-
ical stability and the choices of degree of isolation and quality of governance, the 
relationship becomes ambiguous, but in any case, we would not expect from our 
framework that incumbent regimes would necessarily be less stable when the capital 
is more isolated.40
In contrast, this is quite unlike what one would expect from alternative stories 
that one might concoct to explain the connection between isolated capitals and poor 
governance, such as one based on state capacity. For the sake of an example, con-
sider a story where, if the capital is somehow located in an isolated place, the state 
has a harder time taxing its citizens and developing its fiscal capacity, the lack of 
which leads to bad governance. Besides begging the question of why an incumbent 
regime would refrain from moving its capital to a more favorable location, such a 
story about a relative lack of control over the population would lead us to expect that 
this would be a more fragile, unstable regime.41
Another way to unpack the meaning of governance is to look at a measure of gov-
ernment performance that is unrelated, at least directly, to the political incentives of 
rulers and elites as it pertains to power sharing or political survival. One such mea-
sure has been proposed by Chong et al. (2014) to isolate the government’s ability 
around  0.53 —substantial but far from overwhelming. 
38 The results are the same if we split the sample between autocracies and established democracies, as shown in 
the online Appendix. The coefficient on the isolation of the other largest city in autocracies is small and statistically 
insignificant. 
39 The plots for the other five measures can be seen in the online Appendix. 
40 To see why less isolation would not necessarily be associated with less stability in equilibrium, note that 
it could happen that a relatively unprotected elite would still achieve stability by sharing power and rents more 
broadly, thus discouraging rebellions. 
41 This is as suggested by Herbst (2000) in a different context with respect to low population densities in Africa. 
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to perform a simple task effectively: the average number of days it takes a country’s 
post office to return letters sent to  nonexistent addresses in the countries’ five largest 
cities. This measure ought to be correlated with broader measures of governance.42 
Still, we would not expect it to respond directly to the incentives highlighted by our 
theory.
Panel B in Figure 5 shows that, in spite of that high correlation with governance, 
we find no correlation between that measure of government performance and the 
isolation of the capital city—and again with essentially no distinction between 
democracies and autocracies. This provides further evidence that the stylized fact 
we detect is not an artifact of some correlation between isolated capitals and gener-
ally low state capacity that is unrelated to the kind of forces our theory underscores.
We now turn to the question of whether we can shed direct light on the power 
sharing mechanism highlighted by the theory by looking at the Polity IV dataset. We 
have used the aggregate Polity measure to parse the sample between democracies 
and autocracies, but the data contain more information that can be used to study 
more subtle distinctions. In particular, the Polity measure aggregates the content of 
several other measures—and the extent to which they can be interpreted as relating 
to the degree of power sharing varies considerably.
Out of the four variables aggregated into the Polity IV index of Democracy, two 
are described as pertaining to either the realm of “independence of executive author-
ity” ( ExecutiveConstraints ) or to that of “political competition and opposition” 
( ParticipationCompetitiveness ).43 These are clearly related to the degree of power 
42 For instance, one might imagine that less accountable governments could be more likely to pursue actions 
that would result in ineffective provision of services—say, by packing the post office with incompetent political 
appointees. In fact, the raw correlation with the WGI principal component in our sample is substantial at  − 0.72 . 
43 The former refers to “the extent of institutionalized constraints on the decision-making powers of chief exec-
utives” (Marshall and Gurr 2014, 24), ranging from “unlimited authority” to “executive parity or subordination.” 
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sharing that exists within a political system: an unchecked executive and a limited 
scope for political competition are clear signals of concentration of power.
A first look at how these measures relate to the isolation of the capital city 
is obtained from the instances of capital city moves that were listed in Table 2. 
Table 10 reproduces that list, excluding the cases of partial capital moves, but 
also adding 2 columns describing the changes in  ExecutiveConstraints and 
ParticipationCompetitiveness from 10 years before to 10 years after the date of the 
move (or closest date available). We see a substantial drop in the two measures, 
on average, which is indeed statistically distinguishable from zero in the case of 
ParticipationCompetitiveness , in spite of the very small sample. This indicates that 
the capital city moves are typically accompanied by more concentrated power.
This pattern actually holds more systematically beyond the extreme example of 
capital city moves. Table 11 starts off, in column 1, by looking at the aggregate 
Polity measure and how it relates to the degree of isolation in autocracies. Here, 
we extend the definition of  nondemocracies to include what Polity defines as “open 
anocracies,” delimited by the threshold score of five, because there is naturally con-
siderably less variation in the Polity components in the subset of autocracies and 
closed anocracies. We see a negative correlation, showing that countries with iso-
lated capital cities tend to display institutions that are farther from the democratic 
ideal; the correlation is statistically significant at the 10 percent level only. The con-
nection is brought into sharper focus, however, when we look at the power sharing 
measures of  ExecutiveConstraints and  ParticipationCompetitiveness in columns 2 
The latter in turn captures “the extent to which alternative preferences for policy and leadership can be pursued in 
the political arena” (26) and ranges from “repressed” to “competitive.” 
Table 10—Changes in Capital Cities and Power Sharing
Country From To Year Δ Exec. Constr. Δ Part. Comp.
Russia St. Petersburg Moscow 1918 1 −2
Turkey Istanbul Ankara 1923 −2 −1
Australia Melbourne Canberra 1927 0 0
China Nanjing Beijing 1949 1 −2
Mauritania – Nouakchott 1957 −2 0
Brazil Rio de Janeiro Brasilia 1960 −4 −2
Rwanda Butare Kigali 1962 0 0
North Yemen Ta’izz Sana’a 1962 2 −1
Pakistan Karachi Islamabad 1966 0 0
Malawi Zomba Lilongwe 1974 0 0
Côte d’Ivoire Abidjan Yamoussoukro 1983 1 1
Nigeria Lagos Abuja 1991 −2 −3
Kazakhstan Almaty Astana 1997 −1 −1
Myanmar (Burma) Yangon Naypyidaw 2005 −1 0
Average −0.50 −0.79
p-value 0.266 0.021
Notes: This table excludes partial changes. For sources and notes, see Table 2. Changes in Polity IV variables 
(“Executive Constraints” and “Participation Competitiveness”) are between ten years after and ten years before the 
change of capital with the exception of Mauritania, Rwanda, and Kazakhstan (“pre” measure for first year of inde-
pendence) and Myanmar (Burma) (“post” measure for 2010, latest available). The p-values for the two-sided t-test 
of the null hypothesis of the average are equal to 0 with 13 degrees of freedom.
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and 3, respectively. The quantitative implications are in fact very similar to what we 
found for our measures of governance.
Interestingly, columns 4–5 show no evidence of a negative link between isolated 
capital cities and the other 2 component measures ( RecruitmentCompetitiveness 
and  RecruitmentOpenness ), which have to do with “executive recruitment.”44 The 
measure of openness in particular, while clearly related to democracy, does not 
speak directly to how power is shared between different groups in society: countries 
receive a maximum score in the openness measure essentially as long as succession 
is not hereditary.45 Naturally, all four measures tend to be correlated, so that coun-
tries with high degrees of power sharing will typically score high in the recruitment 
measures as well. It is nevertheless interesting that  RecruitmentOpenness is the least 
correlated with the other three and particularly so with the power sharing measures: 
0.59 and  0.47 when the pairwise correlations between the other three is never below 
0.83 . This suggests that it indeed addresses other aspects of the institutional setting.
C. Additional Results
Beyond the central implications of the model, with respect to conflict and qual-
ity of governance, we can also check its ancillary results. We first look at whether 
capital city inhabitants will be better off relative to their faraway brethren, since 
the greater threat they represent for incumbents enables them to extract additional 
rents in equilibrium, and that this advantage will be greater when the capital is more 
isolated.46
44 In spite of the small samples, the equality of coefficients between combinations of columns 2–3 and columns 
4–5 can be decisively rejected at standard levels of confidence with the exception of that between columns 2 and 4. 
45 This allows, for instance, the  post-Stalin Soviet Union, no one’s idea of a regime with widespread power 
sharing, to achieve that maximum score. 
46 We find related evidence that individuals who live closer to the capital report being more satisfied with what 
they get from national institutions, which we report in the online Appendix to save space. That table uses data from 
the AfroBarometer, which report information on the location of respondents at the village level and covers countries 
that are young democracies at best, where the logic of our model is a meaningful background in their institutional 
settings. Individuals who live farther from the capital are significantly more dissatisfied with the national political 
system (panel A). (This is true controlling for distance to the largest city besides the capital, and for region fixed 
Table 11—Isolated Capital Cities and Power Sharing in Autocracies
 Dependent variable Polity
Executive
constraints
Participation 
competitiveness
Recruitment
competitiveness
Recruitment
openness
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
AvgLogDistance −0.1831 −0.2123 −0.3249 −0.0554 0.1715
[0.109] [0.073] [0.084] [0.097] [0.225]
Selection-corrected bound −0.325 −0.288 −0.414
Observations 63 63 63 63 63
R2 0.450 0.622 0.533 0.541 0.288
Notes: Robust standard errors are in brackets. The z-scores (normalized variables) are reported. For autocracies, 
Polity ≤ 5. Control variables are log GDP per capita, log population, urbanization, region and legal origin dummies, 
majoritarian and presidential system dummies, and ethnic fractionalization. Columns 1 to 3 include the bound from 
zero with Oster’s (forthcoming) correction when the selection by unobservables equals the selection by observables.
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To check this relation, we obtain  cross-country data from the McKinsey Global 
Institute (Dobbs et al. 2011) on  city-level income per capita in 2007 for 600 cities 
around the world. Out of these, 77 are country capitals, and for all these countries, 
we compute the capital city premium as the ratio between the capital’s income per 
capita and the countrywide GDP per capita that we have used in the previous anal-
ysis. By the same token, we proxy investment in military strength by the amount of 
military expenditures pursued by a country’s central government as a percentage of 
total central government expenditures, averaged between 1990 and 2006 (from the 
World Development Indicators).47
Table 12 displays the results of a simple regression analysis along the lines of 
Table 8. The aforementioned data caveats aside, we see a positive, qualitatively 
large correlation between the capital city premium and the isolation of the capital 
in autocracies. In other words, the inhabitants of isolated capital cities of autocratic 
countries earn a substantially larger premium over the rest of the population. This is 
effects, which suggests that they are not driven by the effects of isolation on monitoring or public good provision. 
We also control for a comprehensive set of control variables flagged by Nunn and Wantchekon (2011) as possibly 
correlated with trust.) In contrast, distance to the capital is uncorrelated with measures of generalized trust and of 
the degree of interest and information regarding public affairs, which could also be correlated with perceptions 
of corruption (panel B). 
47 The sample size is now smaller in light of the limited number of countries for which we have data on income 
per capita for the capital city (particularly among  non-democracies), so we now split the sample between autoc-
racies and democracies according to the average of the Polity score between 1975 and 2000, using the threshold 
of zero. (We stop at 1975 in order to restrict ourselves to the  post-decolonization period.) This helps us obtain a 
reasonable sample size of autocracies in contrast with the more recent time period used in Tables 8 and 9. However, 
going back to this less democratic period greatly restricts the sample of countries with a Polity score above nine. 
For this reason, we contrast the autocracy sample with the set of countries with scores above zero. All in all, we are 
still left with a small sample, and for that reason, we have to be especially parsimonious when it comes to the set 
of control variables. 
Table 12—Isolated Capital Cities, Capital Premium, and Military Expenditures
Dependent variable
Capital 
premium:
Capital 
premium:
Capital 
premium:
Military 
budget:
Military 
budget:
Military 
budget:
Autocracies Democracies Full sample Autocracies Democracies Full sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
AvgLogDistance 0.4158 −0.1040 −0.0287 −0.3393 −0.0150 0.0986
[0.141] [0.209] [0.148] [0.124] [0.133] [0.116]
AvgLogDistance × 
 autocracy
0.4096 −0.3912
[0.197] [0.169]
Interstate war 0.4441 0.6072 0.5975
[0.247] [0.235] [0.192]
Selection-corrected bound 0.475 0.466 −0.716 −0.714
Observations 32 32 64 55 51 106
R2 0.398 0.436 0.409   0.382 0.477 0.418
Notes: Robust standard errors are in brackets. The z-scores (normalized variables) are reported. Dependent vari-
ables are GDP per capita in capital city/GDP per capita and military budget (log of share of central government 
budget, avg. 1990–2006, WDI). Interstate war is the dummy for involvement in the interstate war between 1975 
and 2007 (Correlates of War). For autocracies, Polity (1975–2000) ≤ 0; for democracies, Polity (1975–2000) > 0. 
Control variables include log GDP per capita, log population, urbanization, majoritarian and presidential system 
dummies, and ethnic fractionalization. Columns 1, 3, 4, and 6 show the bound from zero with Oster’s (forthcoming) 
correction when the selection by unobservables equals the selection by observables.
334 AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL: APPLIED ECONOMICS JULY 2019
exactly what was predicted by our model. It could certainly be the case that omitted 
factors are also influencing this correlation, but it is telling that once again, as shown 
by columns 2–3, this connection does not extend to those countries that are more 
democratic, just as we would expect from our framework.
Table 12 also shows that autocratic regimes facing a population that is more con-
centrated around its capital city will spend significantly more with the military than 
regimes with isolated capitals. This is exactly in line with the model: isolated cap-
ital cities work as protection against rebellion threats, and hence obviate the need 
for further protection. The same is not at all true of relatively democratic regimes, 
which again reaffirms the model’s logic.48
IV. Concluding Remarks
Our results underscore the importance of the spatial distribution of the population 
as a source of informal checks and balances over autocratic regimes. In particular, 
isolated capitals in weakly institutionalized contexts should be seen as both a symp-
tom and an enabler of misgovernance. We should thus be especially attentive to 
those regimes that are able to ensconce themselves in an isolated capital, as well as 
to policies that enhance that ability, say, by restricting internal mobility. At the same 
time, the model also highlights that this accountability mechanism comes at a price, 
since it operates via the threat of conflict and violent removal from office.49
From a broader perspective, we can think of the spatial distribution of individuals 
as a source of variation in the constraints that underpin institutional choices, but 
one that perhaps strikes a middle ground between what Banerjee and Duflo (2014) 
term “deterministic” and “ non-deterministic” views of political economy: the spa-
tial distribution of population is typically very persistent but is certainly amenable 
to policy intervention and does evolve in the long run. In that sense,  long-run forces 
toward less isolation—say, because the capital city is a pole of attraction due to its 
very role as the seat of political power—would tend to constrain governments, and 
work toward the consolidation of better institutions.
The framework we have developed can presumably be used to understand other 
phenomena related to the threat of revolutions and the response of incumbent 
regimes. In this paper, the variable that affects the extent to which an individual or 
group represents danger to an incumbent elite is their distance to the seat of political 
power, but we can think of other factors that may act in similar ways—say, educa-
tion (Glaeser, Ponzetto, and Shleifer 2007). In such a context, we could sketch a 
theory of incumbent regimes that may choose to pair less power sharing and worse 
governance with, say, less human capital.
As a final example, we can also think about the formation and size of countries. 
Our framework has taken polities as given, but it is natural to think that the tensions 
we have highlighted could translate into pressures in the direction of breaking up 
48 The use of military spending as our proxy for  anti-rebellion investment is predicated on the assumption that 
it is largely driven by this sort of domestic concern. In that regard, we include as a control variable a dummy for 
whether the country has been involved in an interstate conflict between 1975 and 2007 as coded by the Correlates 
of War dataset. 
49 See, e.g., Campante and Glaeser (2018) on the case of Argentina. 
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countries. In that sense, we might think about the potential role of the spatial dis-
tribution of population (and of different subgroups in that population) around the 
capital city in affecting the equilibrium configuration of countries, as modeled for 
instance by Bolton and Roland (1997) and Alesina and Spolaore (2003). We leave 
these as promising avenues for future research.
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